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I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T
O F T H E STATE OF U T A H
J. E. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH
E. BAGNALL, and FLORENCE
BAGNALL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
13753

UNITED PAINT AND COLORS
COMPANY, et al,
Defendant-Respondents.

Brief of Defendant-Respondent
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case, in its overall context, involves an action
for forfeiture of a real estate agreement and to quiet
title to some 570 acres of land in the plaintiffs. The particular matter involved in this appeal involves respondent's motion for summary judgment and the resulting
decree of quiet title, quieting title as against the plaintiffs and in favor of the respondents to a portion of the
land involved.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
An order of Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet
Title was granted in favor of United Paint & Colors
1
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Company (respondent) on March 26, 1974. The plaintiffs then moved to vacate the summary judgment and
that motion was heard and denied by the Court on June
25, 1974, and an order to that effect filed July 8, 1974.
It is from the Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet
Title, and the Order refusing to vacate the said Summary Judgment that the plaintiffs have taken this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants (plaintiffs) seek reversal of the Summary Judgment and Decree Quieting Title and seek to
have the matter remanded back to the District Court for
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 1952, a real estate agreement was
entered into between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall,
as sellers, and Wallace J. Nyberg, Jean B. Nyberg and
Grlenna A. Nyberg, as buyers. At the time of the making
of the said agreement, Jean B. Nyberg was the owner,
apart from any interest acquired by virtue of the real
estate agreement, of an undivided one-half interest in
140.15 acres of the land covered by the real estate agreement. She held that interest as co-tenant with her brother,
J. R. Bagnall, by virtue of a warranty deed dated January 30, 1939, by which Joseph F. Bagnall and Hannah
Bagnall conveyed to the plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, and to
his sister Jean B. Nyberg (one of the purchasers under
the real estate agreement) an undivided one-half interest
in the 140.15 acres. (R. 55, 56) On March 3, 1962, Jean
2
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Nyberg, by warranty deed, deeded the aforesaid 140.15
acres to Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation.
(E.72)
The deed purported to convey a fee simple title to
the land, although Mrs. Nyberg had only the purchasers
interest under the agreement together with the undivided
one-half interest by virtue of the 1939 deed from her
mother and father. On July 16, 1962, Suburbia Land
Company of Idaho, one of the defendants named in the
within action, took possession of the land and entered
into a modification agreement with the plaintiffs. (E.
56) About November 4, 1970, Plaintiffs commenced the
within action in the Sixth District Court to recover
possession of the land and to forfeit the agreements for
non-payment. In March of 1971, Mr. Ronald C. Barker,
attorney for the defendants at that time, filed an answer
to the complaint and in defenses numbered 4 and 6
alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to acquire and
maintain marketable title to the property. After the
filing of the defendants answer by Mr. Barker, and after
at least one conversation between Mr. Barker and Mr.
Merlin O. Baker, plaintiffs' then attorney, wherein the
matter of Jean Nyberg's interest in the property and
her attempted disposition thereof was discussed, plaintiffs, on May 20, 1971, obtained and recorded a quit
claim deed to the 140.15 acres, along with all the
other property covered by the September 1952 agreement, from Donald W. Denton and wife. Mr. and
Mrs. Denton had, at one time, been assignees under
the real estate agreement and had subsequently assigned
their interest under the contract. Also under date of
$
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May 20, 1971, plaintiffs obtained a quit claim deed to
the same 140.15 acres, along with all the other property
covered by the September, 1952 agreement, from Jean
Nyberg (now known as Jean Nyberg Shirk). Curiously,
enough, it was not recorded until May 28, 1971. (B. 9294) Then under date of August 12, 1971, plaintiffs obtained another quit-claim deed to the same property from
a Mr. and Mrs. Mortenson who, at one time, had also been
purchasers and assignees under the contract. And finally, on October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land & Development Corporation, as grantor, conveyed the same 140.15
acres by warranty deed to respondent, United Paint and
Colors Company. (B. 72-A)
Pre-trial conferences in this matter were long and
involved, and the final session thereof was held September 29, 1973, and the pre-trial order was signed November 9, 1973. (B, 49-61) It was not until the filing of the
plaintiffs' Amendment to Amended Complaint (B. 45,
46) that the plaintiff ever called into question the validity
of respondent's fee title to the one-half interest in the
140.15 acres. Bespondents thereafter counterclaimed for
judgment and a decree of quiet title in themselves, (B.
64-69) and for summary judgment in their favor. The
matter was argued to the Court March 22, 1974. At the
time of the hearing both Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall were in
attendance. One of the matters extensively debated was
the question of consideration paid by the Bagnalls for the
quit claim deed. The plaintiffs and their counsel freely
admitted to the Court the existence and the timing of the
deeds from the Nybergs, from the Dentons and from the
Mortonsons. When the Court asked them what had been
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paid for the deeds, including the deed from Jean Nyberg,
Mr. Bagnall, took some time to answer and then stated
that he had forgiven the grantors of any obligations
which they had under the contract.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEED FEOM JEAN B. NYBEEG
SHIRK TO UTAH VALLEY LAND AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION IS VALID
AS A MATTER OF LAW
Appellant (Plaintiff) seeks to rescue himself from
his own folly by calling into question the validity of the
warranty deed from Mrs. Shirk to Utah Valley Land &
Development Corporation upon the ground that the corporate grantee, did not come into existence until some 20
days after the conveyance was signed and delivered to
Mr. Redmond, a promoter of the corporation who became
the president after incorporation. There is no question
but that the contemplated corporation was ultimately
formed under the name of Utah Valley Land & Development Company. Plaintiff has questioned whether that
could be the same corporation since the name "corporation" as contained in the deed appears as "company"
in the articles of the grantee. The record, as designated,
by the plaintiff makes it amply clear that the Utah Valley
Land and Development Corporation referred to in the
deed was the same corporation as was ultimately incorporated under the name of Utah Valley Land and Development Company. (R. 72, 109 lines 15-20 et. seq.)
5
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Fletcher's Cyclopedia on Corporations, Volume 8,
Section 3956, pages 278 and 279 states that " A person
who conveys real property to an association as a corporation cannot avoid the conveyance by denying the corporate existence of the grantee, and this estoppel also
extends to persons who are in privity with the grantor
as is seen in another section." (Emphasis added) He
then goes on to say in section 3989 that:
'' The estoppel of a person dealing with a pretended corporation to deny its legal incorporation
also operates against persons who stand in his
shoes, or, in other words, who are in privity with
him. Thus it clearly operates as against his
executor or administrator, or his heirs, and
against one * * * to whom he conveys property
which he has previously conveyed to a corporation
The Utah Court has spoken clearly and concisely upon
this very question way back in 1903. In the case of Santaquin Mining Company vs. High Roller Mining Company,
71 Pacific Reporter 77, certain individuals by the name
of Kirkman duly entered upon vacant mineral land of
the United States and located the Silver King mining
claim thereon. Subsequently they deeded the claim for
$1.00 and 4,000 shares of stock in the proposed corporation to Santaquin Mining Company, a corporation which
had not yet been incorporated. The deed was handed
to W. H. West, one of the promoters of the proposed
corporation with instructions to deliver it to the secretary
when the corporation was formed. Thereafter, certain
individuals representing the High Roller Mining Coming applied for a patent on some mining claims which

J
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overlapped the property belonging' to Santaquin Mining.
High Roller claimed that the deed to Santaquin was a
nullity because it was executed before the grantee came
into existence. The Utah Court stated:
"A paper purporting to be a deed was made,
signed, acknowledged, and placed on the public
records before the grantee therein named (the
plaintiff) had become a corporate entity. # # *
After incorporation, W. H. West delivered it pursuant to directions, to J. A. West, the secretary of
the company. It then took effect. It became eo
instanti a deed and it then had every requisite required by law. * # * Is not the delivery the very
essence of the transaction? Would it not be demanding a perfectly useless ceremony to require
the owner of the premises to write, sign, and
acknowledge another instrument to the same purport? Clearly such a proceeding would savor
strongly of the nonsensical."
The Court goes on to say that "Both upon reason
and authority we think it is established that the deed
offered by plaintiff was prima facie a valid instrument * * *." The Santaquin Mining case was relied upon
in 1919 when the Utah Court again held that a deed was
valid even though executed before the formation of the
grantee corporation. The writer will merely refer the
Court to headnote number 4 in the case of Beggs et al.
vs. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co. et al, 179 P. 984, wherein the Utah Court stated that " A deed executed by one
company to another before the incorporation of the
grantee company was not for that reason invalid." The
writer is unaware of any Utah case since that time
which is in opposition to the principle.

7
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Clearly, then, under Utah law, the deed executed before incorporation becomes effective upon delivery and
acceptance after incorporation. A 1907 South Carolina
case is instructive on this point. In the case of Sumter
Tobacco Warehouse Co. vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., Limited, of
London, 56 S.E. 654, a deed made out to Sumter Tobacco
& Cotton Warehouse Company was executed a few days
before a charter was obtained by the grantee corporation.
The grantee was actually incorporated as the Sumter
Tobacco Warehouse Company, leaving out the word
"Cotton" as contained in the deed. The warehouse was
destroyed by fire and the insurance company attempted
to avoid payment upon the grounds (among others) that
the deed was a nullity because issued before incorporation of the grantee, and also because the name of the
grantee was not the same in the deed as it was on the
articles of incorporation.
The South Carolina Court stated that " A Deed to
a corporation made before the charter will have effect as
soon as the charter is obtained, on the ground that its
acceptance should be presumed as soon as the corporation is competent to accept it." (Emphasis added) The
Court made the observation that it is the duty of the
courts to give effect to deeds made in good faith rather
than to destroy them on technical grounds. The court
further stated that the slight change in the name of the
corporation could make no difference. "To hold that
the slight change in the name of the corporation should
defeat the deed would be to refuse to regard the intention
of all parties concerned for the sake of an attenuated
technicality." See also 4 Thompson on Corporations,
5114, 5115.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT
•;-

T

l

T H E VALIDITY OF "Hir: UEI1D I S GOVEKNKD BY FT.MI ; UV

Plaint
have erroiieoii>.ly implied that the ia\v of
the State of California, where ihe deed wa- purportedly
executed, should govern ihe interpretation and ( f !eet
thereof. Such is definitely not the case. Jn Am. -\.f\ :M,
Conflict of Laws, ^ 16 states as follow.-:
"' Fmiii the general principles heretofore stated,
if follows that all instruments affecting the title
to real estate, no matter what their nature, must
be governed, as to their execution, construction,
and validity, exclusively by the laws of the state
in which the real estate is situated. F o r example,
if a deed is executed in one jurisdiction and the
land lies in another, the requisites and validity of
the conveyance are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction where the land, is situated. Questions
as to legal effect of a conveyance are also governed by the law of the state m which the land is
situated.' J
Section 17 <uiu-is

;So omnipotent is the lex loci rei sitae that
it even governs in regard to the capacity of the
person making the instrument, no matter what its
nature. Therefore, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making
it is incapacitated by the lex rei sitae, even though
by the law of his domicil and by the law of the
place where the instrument is actually made his
capacity is undoubted. The same principles apply
as to capacity of the person who is to take, (Emphasis added)

•9
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It is abundantly clear, without belaboring the point,
that it is the law of Utah that is to determine whether
he deed is valid, and it is likewise abundantly clear that
as a matter of Utah law, it is valid in this case.

POINT

III

THE TITLE OF UNITED PAINT AND
COLOES COMPANY IS SUPEEIOE, AS A
MATTEE OF LAW, TO THAT OF PLAINTIFFS, J. E. AND FLOEENCE BAGNALL
It is undisputed that Jean Nyberg held an undivided
one-half interest in the 140.15 acres with her brother, J.
E. Bagnall, as a result of a warranty deed from her
father and mother dated January 30, 1939. Such interest,
of course, arose prior to, and was separate from any
claim she would have to the property as a purchaser
under the 1952 real estate agreement. It is also undisputed that she conveyed her interest in that 140.15 acres
of land to Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation by means of a warranty deed signed March 3, 1962
(E.72).
Another deed exists which also was signed by Jean
B. Nyberg purporting to convey the same piece of property together with all the other property covered by the
September 1952 agreement, to Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall.
This deed was signed May 20,1971. Finally, a third deed
is involved dated October 5, 1971, by which Utah Valley
Land conveys its interest by warranty deed to United
Paint and Colors Company, respondent herein.

V>
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a is impossible for tin- plaintiffs, under [he circumstances in this case, to become1 bona fide purchasers for
value so far as the subject piece of property is concerned.
The whole warp and woof of one of the defenses to plaintiffs complaint, raised by Suburbia Land Company and
others named as purchasers under the contract, was that
Bagnalls had not acquired and maintained a good title to
all of the land. As early as March 1:-H, Bagnails were
made aware of such claim by means of llic answer filed
by the defendants then attorney, Eonald (\ Barker, particularly in defenses 4 and 6. The Court, at the hearing on
the Summary Judgment motion, was aware of much
which is not revealed by sue record, including the existence of the unit claim deeds from th<! Dentons and the
Mortonsons, the supposed considerate<» paid for tiiose
deeds and etc., all of which showed etna! knowledge
by the plaintiffs of the respondents claim *fi Mm property.
I n addition, Suburbia. Land Company, Sanpete Land
and Livestock Company, and various of hers had been in
possession of the land from 1(M\2 under various claims of
right. Bagnall was aware of such and in fact joined them
as defendants in his lawsuit to- forfeit the' contract;. It is. a
general rule of property law that one who deals with
properly in !he possession of a third party is chargeable
with knowledge of everything which inquiry of the party
in possession would have, or could have, revealed. Bagnails, in securing the quit claim deed from Jean knew unequivocally that Jean, was not in possession. Therefore
they are chargeable with anything which an inquiry of
the parties in possession would have revealed. The claim
of the defendants had been all along that Bagnall did not

11
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have good title, and that Jean Nyberg had issued certain
warranty deeds which constituted a cloud upon the title.
An inquiry by Bagnall would almost certainly have revealed that United Paint and Color was asserting a
claim of ownership to the land.
The Utah Court, in 1939, in the case of Meagher vs.
Dean et al, 91 Pacific Keporter 2d. 454 on page 454 stated:
"An open, notorious, unequivocal, and exclusive possession of realty under an apparent
claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all
the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts,
whether such claim is legal or equitable in its
nature.''
The Court further stated:
"To establish the fact of notice of claim to
land from possession thereof, it is not necessary to
show that person to be affected by notice knew of
possession, but if possession was of character required by law, and had sufficient notoriety, certainty and exclusiveness, the notice is a legal deduction from the fact of possession."
"The possession of a tenant is the possession
of the landlord, and hence notice of the possession
of the tenant is notice of the possession of the
landlord."
"The possession of a purchaser of land under
an unrecorded contract therefor is sufficient to
put all persons upon inquiry as to his right, and
they are chargeable with such knowledge of vendor's title which they would obtain by such inquiry."
"Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put purchaser on his guard and call for
inquiry is notice of everything to which such
inquiry might have led."
12
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Bagnalls knew that parties othei tium Jean Xyberg
were in possession. Having such knowledge, (here is no
way they could escape the legal consequences of that
knowledge. I t is a legal deduction that they are chargeable with the claim of United Paint and Colors. The sequence of events leading up to the acquisition of the deeds
by the Bagnalls from HIP Nybergs, from the Dentons, and
from the MorltMisons, phis iho fact that the deed describes all !li<- !<IIM! covered by the September 1952 Real
Estate Agreement makes it quite evident f Imf they were
merely tying up loose ends of the huv.-uii and *=• *i :»;irchasing property for any real consideration. The recording statute was not enacted to protect one from deliberate
nor intent inna) ignorance of the title. In the case of
Pender vs. Bird, :>2-l KJd, 1057, the Lrtah Court stated
that;
iir
The recording statute was w>t enacted in
protect one whose ignorance of the title is deliberate and intentional, nor does a more nominal confederation satisfy requirement that a valuable
consideration must be paid, but the purpose of
the statute is to protect one who honestly believes
he is acquiring a good title, and who invests some
..:•..;/. substantial sum in reliance on that belief." (Emphasis added)
Clearly then, the plaintiffs ci'uhl MM hecnm** bona
fide purchasers of the 140.15 acres bcean>e they had
actual knowledge of claims by third parties (Utah Valley
Land and also United Paint and Color), and even if they
actually did not, they are chargeable with such knowledge
because of the possession of the defendants, Suburbia,
Sanpete and etc. They know that someone other than

m
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Jean Nyberg was claiming some rights in the land. That
is sufficient to put them on notice of respondent's claim.
The plaintiffs are further frustrated in their efforts
to claim BFP status because of their failure to pay any
significant consideration for the quit claim deed. It is
their obligation to come forward, both at the time of the
original hearing as well as now, with evidence to establish that they were bona fide purchasers. They have completely failed in any such proof. The affidavits of the
plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall (R. 90-91, 95-96) do not
mention any consideration whatsoever. They make a legal
conclusion that they paid "valuable consideration" but
they do not tell us what it was. It is clearly the prerogative of the Court to determine whether "valuable consideration" was given, and it is not bound by the affiants
self serving statement that it was given. The record, then,
even as designated by the plaintiffs clearly will support
the trial court's determination that the deed to United
Paint and Colors is superior to that of plaintiffs.
In addition to the lack of evidence produced by the
appellants, the response which they made to the inquiry
by the Court as to what they had paid is even more damning. When asked, Mr. Bagnall, after some hesitation,
responded that Jean had been forgiven her obligations
under the contract. The Court will observe that she had
absolutely no obligation under the contract at all. By
bringing suit to forfeit the contract, plaintiffs had made
their election. They could not, and did not, sue for any
damages or deficiencies under the contract. Their remedy
of forfeiture was complete in itself and no other remedy
14
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was available to plaintiffs against Jean. Furthermore,
she had not answered, and her default had been entered.
Under these circumstances, it is readily seen that the
"valuable consideration" given by Bagnalls to Jean was
absolutely no consideration at all. Add to this, the fact
that the recording statute requires something more than
nominal consideration to support a claim of bona fide
purchaser, and it is again clear that Bagnalls could not,
under any view of the pleadings and facts available to
the trial judge, establish that they were purchasers in
good faith.
In modern practice a quitclaim, such as the one
from Jean Nyberg to the Plaintiffs, is used where the
grantor intends to convey only such interest as he has,
in contradistinction to a grant of the fee or other estate
with warranty of title. Such a deed is as effectual to convey whatever interest the grantor has in the subject of the
deed as is any other form of conveyance. It must be
noted, however, that it will convey only such interest as
the grantor actually has. See 23 Am. Jur 2d., Deeds,
Section 291.
In section 292 of 23 Am J u r 2d., it states :
"All courts agree that a quitclaim deed, unless a contrary intent appears, passes all the
right, title, and interest which the grantor has at
the time of making the deed, which is capable of
being transferred by deed, and nothing more."
(Emphasis added)
Further on, on page 324 it states:
"Conversely, under a conveyance by a quitclaim deed the grantee: can acquire no better in15
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terest than the grantor had. If the grantor himself has no title or interest of the property conveyed, most courts hold that the grantee takes
nothing under a quitclaim deed, and the instrument is regarded as merely a release or formal
disclaimer on the part of the grantor, notwithstanding the use of additional words of grant."
(Emphasis added)
Again, on page 325 it is said:
" I n those jurisdictions where it is customary
to convey by grant with express or implied warranty of title, presumably the grantee will not
accept a quitclaim deed unless the contract of
sale provides that this form of conveyance shall
be accepted by the purchaser. Accordingly, it may
be said that a quitclaim deed carries with it
notice of every defect which there may be in the
grantor's title" (Emphasis added)
The Utah Court has not decided the precise question
of whether one who takes under a quitclaim deed can
become a bona fide purchaser for value. Many jurisdictions have decided this question though, and the decisions
have admittedly gone both ways. Texas is illustrative of
the decisions holding that the grantee under a quitclaim
deed cannot become a bona fide purchaser and is therefore chargeable with knowledge of all prior legal and
equitable titles, whether recorded or unrecorded. Numerous Texas cases relying on the holding of Miller et al.
vs. Pullman et al, 72 S.W. 2d. 379, have so held. In the
case of Stonum et ux. vs. Schultz et al., 138 S.W. 2d.
825, the Texas court at page 828 stated:
. <<* • * rp^y s |.yj Would not have been entitled to protection as innocent purchasers, for
16
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the reason that the residuum-like instruments
under which they sought to claim this property
amounted to merely a quitclaim of something
that had already been conveyed away out of their
chains of title; so that, even though they did pay
value for those instruments, and despite that fact
that they carried such warranty, they still could
not qualify under them, as subsequent bona fide
purchasers of this particular property for value"
The law in Utah is similar to that of other jurisdictions concerning the interpretation and effect of quitclaim deeds. The Utah statutes make a clear and unmistakable differentiation between the two types of
conveyances. 57-1-12, referring to the form and effect of
a warranty deed states that such a deed, when executed,
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to
the grantee. 75-1-13, on the other hand, referring to the
form and effect of a quitclaim deed, states that a quitclaim, when executed, shall only have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the
grantor. In Nix et al. vs. Tooele County, (Utah 1941)
101 U. 84, 118 P. 2d. 376, Tooele County conducted a tax
sale of certain property and conveyed it by quitclaim
deed. It turned out that the County's title was defective
and the purchasers at the tax sale acquired nothing. They
then sued to get their money back. The trial court granted
judgment for the plaintiffs and against the county. On
appeal the judgment was vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss. The Court stated on page 377 :

T

"Plaintiffs' title is founded upon quitclaim
deeds. Such deeds do not imply the conveyance of
any particular interest in property. See section
78-1-12, E.S.U. 1933, as compared with section
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78-1-11, E.S.TJ. 1933. Plaintiffs acquired only the
interest of their grantors, be that interest what it
may.'7 (Emphasis added)
In the case of Dowse vs. Kammerman, (Utah 1952)
122 U. 85, 246 P.2d 965, the plaintiff Dowse obtained
certain property by tax deed at a time when values were
low. The consideration therefore was relatively small.
He quitclaimed to the Doris Trust Company, apparently
for a substantial consideration, and Doris Trust conveyed by warranty deed to the defendants. Years later,
but a comparatively short time before defendants interest would have ripened into unimpeachable title by adverse possession, — when land values had trebled or
quadrupled — plaintiff purchased the title of the record
owners for a paltry sum, sued to quiet title against the
defendant on the grounds that the tax deed was defective, and thereby attacked the very title which he formerly
had and sold. He did not even offer to disgorge the
amount of his unjust enrichment. Even in the face of the
obvious unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, the Court refused to depart from the long standing rule that a quitclaim does not convey after acquired title. In other words,
the plaintiff won because the quitclaim conveyed only
such interest as he had at the time and his own after
acquired title was superior to his previous quitclaim conveyance for value. The Court stated that the grantee
must know that a quitclaim deed only passes the right,
title and interest which the grantor then has, and cited
78-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 in support thereof.
This section is contained in the 1953 Code as 57-1-13.
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Clearly, then, Utah would, and should, hold that the
grantee under a quitclaim deed must take subject to all
infirmities, recorded and unrecorded, in the grantor's
title. The very nature of the quitclaim deed to the Bagnalls amounts to nothing more than a disclaimer by Jean
and precludes the appellants from becoming innocent
purchasers for value.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the facts and the
record in this case clearly demonstrate that the judgment of the trial court quieting title in respondents as
against the plaintiffs was proper and should not be disturbed on appeal. The deed from Jean Nyberg to Utah
Valley Land was valid and effective, as was the conveyance from Utah Valley Land to United Paint and
Colors.
The quitclaim from Jean Nyberg to plaintiffs, coming some nine years after Jean has conveyed by warranty deeds to Utah Valley Land, was made with
full knowledge by the Bagnalls that there were
claims by third parties against the land, and the complete lack of any meaningful consideration from Bagnalls
to Jean negatives any possibility of them becoming bona
fide purchasers for value. The record is completely lacking in anything which would even imply that anything of
value was given by the plaintiffs for the conveyance, and
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I

there was nothing to be decided by a trial of these matters. Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD, for:
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS
& DALEABOTJT
28 North 100 East
P. 0. Box 1097
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for DefendawtRespondent
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